State v. Johnson Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43457 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-14-2016
State v. Johnson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43457
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Johnson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43457" (2016). Not Reported. 2683.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2683
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43457 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR 2013-6309 
v.     ) 
     ) 
LANNETTE KAY JOHNSON, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH  JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
________________________ 
 




SARA B. THOMAS     KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender  Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho     Criminal Law Division 
I.S.B. #5867      P.O. Box 83720 
       Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
JENNY C. SWINFORD    (208) 334-4534 
 Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9263 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701  
(208) 334-2712 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR      ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT   PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
 i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................1 
 Nature of the Case .....................................................................................1 
 
 Statement of the Facts and 
 Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................1 
 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................4 
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................5 
 
 The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Johnson’s  
 Motion To Suppress .........................................................................................5 
 
A. Introduction  ..............................................................................................5 
 
B. Standard Of Review ...................................................................................5 
 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Johnson’s  
  Motion To Suppress ...................................................................................5 
 
1. Ms. Johnson’s Consent To Search Her Vehicle Was  
Not Voluntary ........................................................................................5 
 
2. Ms. Johnson’s Statements Were The Product Of A Custodial  
Interrogation Without Miranda Warnings ...............................................7 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 10 













TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) .................................................................... 8 
Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012) ....................................................................... 10 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ........................................................................ 5 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ........................................................... 6 
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) .................................................................. 8 
State v. Christensen, 159 Idaho 339 (Ct. App. 2015) ...................................................... 8 
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405 (2012)........................................................................... 5 
State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519 (2002) ................................................................................ 8 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) ........................................................................... 8 
State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791 (2003)................................................................... 6, 7, 8 
State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94 (Ct. App. 2006) ........................................................... 6, 7 
State v. James, 148 Idaho 574 (2010) ............................................................................ 8 
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680 (Ct. App. 2011) ...................................................... 6 
State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482 (2007) .............................................................................. 6 
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848 (2001) .............................................................................. 6 
State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230 (2005) .............................................................................. 5 









STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Lannette Kay Johnson moved to suppress her statements made during a traffic 
stop and the evidence obtained from the search of her vehicle. The district court denied 
her motion. She entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the 
district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Ms. Johnson appeals from the district 
court’s judgment of conviction, contending the district court erred by denying her motion 
to suppress. 
  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings  
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Ms. Johnson committed the crime 
of possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.16–17.) This allegation arose out of a 
traffic stop wherein the police found methamphetamine in Ms. Johnson’s vehicle. 
(R., pp.64–65.) Ms. Johnson waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound 
her over to district court. (R., pp.28, 30.) The State filed an Information charging 
Ms. Johnson with possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.31.)  
Ms. Johnson filed a motion to suppress, arguing the evidence found in her 
vehicle was the result of a warrantless search and her statements made during the 
traffic stop were involuntary. (R., pp.38–39.) The State responded in opposition. 
(R., pp.51–59.) The State also filed an Amended Information, charging Ms. Johnson 
with a sentencing enhancement for a prior felony drug offense. (R., pp.47–48.) 
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The district court held a hearing on the motion. (R., pp.62–63; see generally 
Tr. Vol. I,1 p.4, L.2–p.48, L.4.) Ms. Johnson and Deputy Stewart testified, and a video 
recording of the stop was admitted into evidence. (Tr. Vol. I, p.4, L.14–p.46, L.24; see 
Def.’s Ex. A (hereinafter, Video).) After the hearing, the district court issued a decision 
with the following factual findings: 
During daylight hours on April 24, 2013, Deputy Stewart witnessed 
a van pull partially into oncoming traffic before making a left-hand turn. 
Deputy Stewart stopped the van for the violation and contacted the driver, 
[Ms. Johnson]. Deputy Stewart noticed that Ms. Johnson’s eyes were 
glossy, had dilated pupils, and she was shaking. After initial contact, 
Deputy Stewart turned off his overhead lights that were visible to 
Ms. Johnson. He then told her that he would only be issuing a warning, 
but he asked her to step out of the van and move to the back of the 
vehicle to speak with him.  
Once Ms. Johnson was outside, Deputy Stewart told Ms. Johnson 
that he believed she had substances in her system and Ms. Johnson 
admitted to consuming alcohol that day and to smoking marijuana two 
weeks prior. Deputy Stewart told Ms. Johnson that due to her 
nervousness, he believed she had something illegal in the vehicle and that 
her nervousness would go away if she would be honest with him. 
Ms. Johnson admitted that she had marijuana and a pipe in her purse and 
Deputy Stewart asked Ms. Johnson to reach in and pull her purse out of 
the van. Ms. Johnson reached in and began rummaging through her purse 
instead of retrieving it. Deputy Stewart called her name multiple times to 
get her to stop rummaging, and when Ms. Johnson continued rummaging 
in her purse, Deputy Stewart detained her and placed her in handcuffs for 
officer safety and evidence preservation. While Deputy Stewart was 
conducting an initial pat down search, but before he could advise 
Ms. Johnson of her Miranda rights and not in response to any questioning 
by Deputy Stewart, Ms. Johnson said that there may be 
methamphetamine in the vehicle.  
Deputy Stewart completed his pat down search and read 
Ms. Johnson her Miranda rights before Ms. Johnson stated again that 
there may be methamphetamine in her purse. She told Deputy Stewart 
that her daughter’s boyfriend put the methamphetamine in her purse and 
that she wanted to cooperate with law enforcement to get her daughter 
                                            
1 There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a 
transcript of the suppression motion hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains a 
transcript of the entry of plea hearing. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the 
sentencing hearing. 
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help. After two more deputies arrived, Deputy Stewart asked for 
permission to search the vehicle for the drugs. Ms. Johnson gave consent 
along with specific instructions on how to open the van’s door. Deputy 
Stewart found the methamphetamine in the van . . . .  
 
(R., pp.64–65.) Based on these facts, the district court determined the warrantless 
search of Ms. Johnson’s vehicle was lawful because Ms. Johnson provided Deputy 
Stewart with voluntary consent. (R., pp.66–67.) The district court also determined her 
statements were admissible because they were made out of custody or voluntarily. 
(R., pp.67–69.) Thus, the district court denied the motion. (R., p.69.)  
Ms. Johnson and the State entered into an Idaho Criminal Rule 11 conditional 
plea agreement. (R., pp.135–38.) Ms. Johnson reserved the right to appeal the district 
court’s denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.135–36.) Ms. Johnson pled guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance, and the State dismissed the sentencing 
enhancement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, L.19–p.10, L.20; R., pp.149, 158.) The district court 
sentenced Ms. Johnson to five years, with two years fixed, suspended her sentence, 
and placed her on probation. (Tr. Vol. III, p.17, L.23–p.18, L.7; R., pp.162–65.) 
Ms. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s judgment of 
conviction. (R., pp.166–68, 176–78, 181–83.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Johnson’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 





 Ms. Johnson submits that the district court erred by denying her motion to 
suppress her statements and the evidence found in her vehicle. She argues the district 
court erred because her statements were the result of a custodial interrogation without 
Miranda2 warnings and her consent to search was not voluntary. 
  
B. Standard Of Review 
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). “The Court accepts 
the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 
Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of 
constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. 
  
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Johnson’s Motion To Suppress 
 There were two issues raised by Ms. Johnson’s suppression motion: the 
warrantless search of her vehicle and her statements made during the stop. (R., pp.38–
39.) Each issue will be addressed in turn. 
  
1. Ms. Johnson’s Consent To Search Her Vehicle Was Not Voluntary 
 
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from 
unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant 
                                            
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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issued on probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 
791, 796 (2003) (citations omitted). Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the 
warrant requirement. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007); State v. Jaborra, 143 
Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006). “It is the State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or 
coercion, direct or implied.” Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97.  
“A voluntary decision is one that is ‘the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker.’ An individual’s consent is involuntary, on the other 
hand, ‘if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically 
impaired.’” Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). To 
determine whether an individual’s will was overborne in a particular case, “the court 
must assess ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics 
of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
at 226). “In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the 
consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police 
questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who 
consents.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229; accord, e.g., State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 
852 (2001); State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct. App. 2011). Factors 
pertaining to the subjective state of the person who consents include “lack of 
education,” “low intelligence,” and “the repeated and prolonged nature of the 
questioning.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226. Additional factors include: (a) the number of 
officers involved in the confrontation; (b) the location and conditions of the consent, 
such as the time of day; (c) if the police retained the individual’s identification; (d) 
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whether the individual was free to leave; and (e) whether the individual knew of his right 
to refuse consent. Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97. 
In this case, the totality of the circumstances shows that Ms. Johnson’s consent 
to search the vehicle was not voluntary. At the time of her consent, Ms. Johnson was 
not free to leave. (R., p.65.) Ms. Johnson was in handcuffs. (R., p.65.) She was 
detained for approximately forty minutes and in handcuffs for half of that time. (Video, 
19:38–20:20, 41:15–41:28.) Not only was Ms. Johnson restrained for an extended 
period of time, but also outnumbered by the police. There were three officers present 
when Deputy Stewart asked for Ms. Johnson to consent. (R., p.65.) Moreover, 
Ms. Johnson’s testimony and her conduct shown on the video indicate that she had a 
vulnerable subjective state at the time. During her testimony, she explained that her 
interaction with the police was “fuzzy” and she had a difficult time remembering stressful 
events due to post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.20–p.10, L.25.) In the 
video, Ms. Johnson informs Deputy Stewart multiple times that she is exhausted, her 
head is pounding, and she needs to get to work. (Video, 12:47–13:03, 14:09–15:12, 
17:33–17:48.) In light of these facts, Ms. Johnson did not give voluntary consent to 
search her vehicle. Therefore, the district court erred by denying her motion to 
suppress. 
  
2. Ms. Johnson’s Statements Were The Product Of A Custodial Interrogation 
Without Miranda Warnings 
 
“Miranda v. Arizona requires that a person be informed of his or her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to custodial interrogation; 
otherwise, incriminating statements are inadmissible.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 
 8 
795 (2003). “Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is ‘in custody’” and subject 
to an “interrogation.” State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576 (2010); Hansen, 138 Idaho at 
795. If the defendant provides a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his 
Miranda rights, the defendant’s statements made during a custodial interrogation may 
be admitted at trial. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 n.7 (2011); State v. Doe, 137 
Idaho 519, 523 (2002). 
“A person is in custody whenever subjected to a restraint on his or her liberty in 
any degree similar to a formal arrest.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795 (citations omitted). “To 
determine whether custody has attached, ‘a court must examine all of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting 
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)). 
Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the 
person’s freedom of movement (including whether the person is placed in 
handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the detention is more than 
temporary, the location and visibility of the interrogation, whether other 
individuals were present, the number of questions asked, the duration of 
the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of 
officers present, the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the 
conduct of the officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning. 
 
State v. Christensen, 159 Idaho 339, 351 (Ct. App. 2015). “The test is an objective one 
and ‘the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would 
have understood his situation.’” James, 148 Idaho at 577 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)). “A person is interrogated whenever subjected to express 
questioning or its functional equivalent, i.e. anything reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 795. 
 Here, the district court divided Ms. Johnson’s statements into two periods: (1) 
statements made from Ms. Johnson’s initial contact with Deputy Stewart until he 
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restrained her with handcuffs; and (2) statements made from Deputy Stewart restraining 
Ms. Johnson until he provided her with Miranda warnings. (R., p.68.) With respect to the 
first period, the district court then determined: 
Ms. Johnson was not in custody during the first period because a 
reasonable person in her situation would not have believed she was in 
custody. The traffic stop was reasonable in duration and during daylight 
hours. Deputy Stewart even turned off his overhead lights that were visible 
to Ms. [Johnson] so that she would feel free to leave. Deputy Stewart’s 
questions were also reasonable in number and intensity and his overall 
conduct towards Ms. Johnson during the encounter was calm, respectful, 
and not intimidating. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant did not 
establish that she was in custody during this portion of the pre-Miranda 
traffic stop. 
 
(R., p.68.) For the second period, the district court reasoned: 
 
Ms. Johnson was not under arrest for the second period of the pre-
Miranda stop, and even if she were custody for Miranda purposes, the 
statements she made prior to being read her Miranda rights are 
admissible because they were not made as a result of any police 
questioning. Miranda rights protect individuals from self-incrimination as a 
result of police questioning, so aside from custody, there must also be 
questioning for them to apply. Deputy Stewart did not ask any questions 
during this period and all statements made by Ms. Johnson were 
volunteered. Therefore, the statements made post-custody, but pre-
Miranda warning are admissible. 
 
(R., p.69.) Ms. Johnson submits that these determinations were in error in light of the 
facts found by the district court.  
Ms. Johnson contends that the totality of the circumstances show she was in 
custody during the first period. For example, Ms. Johnson asked early on if there was 
“anything else” Deputy Stewart needed because she had to get to work, but he ignored 
this question and continued with his investigation. (Video, 14:09–14:25.) Under these 
circumstances, a reasonable person in Ms. Johnson’s position would not have felt she 
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was “at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 
1181, 1189 (2012) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).  
Similarly, Ms. Johnson contends that the totality of the circumstances show she 
was subject to the functional equivalent of an interrogation during the second period. 
Once Ms. Johnson reached inside her vehicle, she was quickly restrained in handcuffs 
by Deputy Stewart because he believed she could be reaching to grab a weapon. 
(Video, 19:25–19:54.) She then immediately informed Deputy Stewart that she was not 
getting a weapon, but she “grabbed a pouch for someone” and “I think there’s meth.” 
(Video, 19:38–20:55.) Under these circumstances, Deputy Stewart’s comments about a 
weapon in the vehicle were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.  
In light of these facts, the district court erred by denying Ms. Johnson’s motion to 
suppress her statements because the requirements of custody and interrogation were 
met during both periods. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order 
of judgment and commitment and reverse the district court’s order denying her motion 
to suppress.   
 DATED this 14th day of March, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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